We investigate adblocking lters and the extent to which websites and advertisers react when their content is impacted by these lters. We collected data daily from the Alexa Top-5000 web sites for 120 days, and from speci c sites that newly appeared in lter lists for 140 days. By evaluating how long a lter rule triggers on a website, we can gauge how long it remains e ective. We matched websites with both a regular adblocking lter list (EasyList) and with a specialized lter list that targets anti-adblocking logic (Nano Defender). From our data, we observe that the e ectiveness of the EasyList adblocking lter decays a modest 0.13% per day, and after around 80 days seems to stabilize. We found no evidence for any signi cant decay in e ectiveness of the more specialized, but less widely used, anti-adblocking removal lters.
INTRODUCTION
Internet advertising is a signi cant source of income for many web sites as well as for apps on mobile platforms. On the other hand, advertisements are not desired by many users. Ads consume bandwidth and battery power, and are a source of attacks, such as malvertisements and social engineering hacks (e.g., "viruses found on your system!"). Adblockers help users block this unwanted content. Early adblockers were simple DNS blacklists. Modern adblockers follow a standardized syntax to specify patterns in hostnames as well as digging deeper into the DOM structure of a website to remove speci c elements (see Section 2.2). A standardized syntax allows anyone to create lter rules. These rules can be generic to any web site while others are site-speci c or * Now working at Google even country-speci c. EasyList and other organizations centrally publish lists of these rules, which can be imported by a variety of di erent ad-blocking extensions supported by most modern web browsers.
Such lists threaten advertising and the accompanying revenue. Unsurprisingly, both advertisers and their hosting websites have found a variety of ways to push back. Recent anti-adblocking technologies allow websites to detect the presence of adblocking systems and change their behavior accordingly. Websites can then request the user to disable their adblocker, or simply block the detected adblock-using visitor. This has the makings of an "adblock war": users are blocking ads, and websites are blocking users. A new advertisement may initially bypass the lters, which will cause the lter lists to be updated and block the ad. . . which may cause the advertiser to update its code to defeat the blocking.
In this paper, we investigate whether lter lists and advertisers respond to each other in such a fashion. For three months, we continuously monitored lter lists and the websites a ected by them, adding new websites as lter lists expanded. For each rule in a list, we tracked when it a ected the corresponding website. We looked at the aggregated data to see if there was an overall trend, that is, how long it took for advertisers to react to a new blocking rule, and how long it took for lter rules to react to updated advertisements.
We will look at two separate lter lists: EasyList 1 , which is widely used and enabled by default in many browser adblocking plugins, and Nano Defender 2 , which is much less popular but speci cally targets web page logic that attempts to defeat ad-blocking.
Contributions and limitations:
When we began this work, no other study had used daily scans of large numbers of websites to analyze adblocking. Now, several other researchers have conducted studies in this area (discussed in Section 2.1), but with di erent methodologies.
Our study has several limitations. First, we use lter lists respecting the standard "Adblock Plus" syntax. We do not measure other adblocking or privacy-enhancing techniques, such as behaviors of or responses to browser extensions such as Ghostery or NoScript. Moreover, our study's results are con ned to the capabilities of the Adblock Plus engine and the coverage of the monitored lists: any advertisement not blockable by the engine, or not in any of the lists, is not considered. Lastly, there are several possible sources of noise in our data. Some of these are internal and known, such as failure to connect to a website on a speci c day. There may also be external factors, such as a website switching ad providers.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 2.1 Related work
Many studies have analyzed online advertising and adblocking. Some examined overall adblock usage and/or sentiment, either by surveying users [3, 12] or analyzing aggregate user data [11, 19] . Others have looked at the e ectiveness of adblocking as a privacy tool (e.g., [1, 5, 23, 25] created an "anti-adblock" detection approach. They automatically visit targeted sites multiple times with and without adblocking and analyze the di erences in the execution time. They found that 30.5% of the Alexa Top 5K used some form of anti-adblocking code.
Parts of the work by Iqbal et al.
[9] resemble our study. In 2017 they set out to determine how adblock detection evolved. They approach this by using the Internet Archive to retrieve previous versions of websites and match them against a lter list. Our study uses similar adblock detection, but we collected live data directly, not archived data via a third party. In 2018, they published a followup study [10] looking at multiple layers of the web stack (HTML, HTTP, Javascript), building a supervised machine learning model to block ads and trackers.
A recent tech report by Vastel et al.
[24] independently uses a similar approach to ours. They also analyzed Ea-syList's performance on Alexa top sites in order to better understand lter lists. While doing so, they posed several of the same questions we do in this paper and used a number of methods that were similar to our own, albeit relying on a substantially di erent implementation approach. Our work on this area di ers in two key ways from the work by Vastel et al. First, we examined more lter lists than just EasyList. Second, we use di erent statistical methods to summarize our data.
How adblocking works
Adblocking lters have rules expressed in a simple syntax 3 . Rules can simply specify a URL or domain name, with or without wildcards, which will prevent undesired elements from even being loaded. Rules can also specify DOM elements by ID or class, or by any of a variety of features, including a path through the DOM tree, or styling attributes like width and height. Such advertising elements will be removed from the DOM even if they're added dynamically by JavaScript behaviors. Because these rules have the potential to be too broad, exception rules are supported, where an exception will override a blocking rule.
Anti-adblocking techniques generally work by introducing "bait" elements into the DOM that would be removed by an adblocker. By using JavaScript to inspect the DOM, any missing bait elements imply the presence of an adblocker. The site can then take additional actions, such as requesting the user to disable their adblocker. Bait elements can be avoided using exception rules. Alternatively, anti-antiadblocking rules can directly target the JavaScript used by the anti-adblockers. EasyList has a speci c policy with regard to anti-adblocking rules: "Anti-Adblock should only be challenged if the system limits website functionality or causes signi cant disruption to browsing" 4 , whereas Nano Defender has no such limitations.
METHODOLOGY
The goal of our experiment is to determine if and to what extent websites respond to adblock updates and adblockers respond to website updates. A meaningful answer to this question must be based on data collected from many websites and lter rulesets taken over time. Therefore, our methodology is described in two parts: data collection and data analysis.
Data collection
We collected two main types of data: daily iterations of the EasyList and Nano Defender (and predecessors) lter lists and daily scrapes of various targeted websites. For the lter lists, all the relevant les and commit histories are available on either GitHub or the AdblockPlus team's Mercurial repository 5 . We iterated through every commit in the project histories for every particular lter list and then downloaded the nal revision on every day there was at least one commit.
We note that Nano Defender e ectively is a fork of an earlier project called Anti-Adblock Killer, apparently abandoned by its author in 2016. The Anti-Adblock Killer rules, inherited by Nano Defender, appear as a single large commit in the Nano Defender ruleset. As these rules are all signi cantly older than the time period of our web scraping activities we ignored them when looking speci cally at the day-by-day impact of a given rule on our corpus of web scrapes.
Our approach to scraping websites di ers from most studies discussed in Section 2.1. Generally speaking, most studies used Selenium to drive browsers running on local machines. Although doing so is highly e ective for doing one-o jobs, we were performing daily scrapes on a large number of websites for months on end. We used the Scrapinghub cloud platform 6 . Using their open-source Scrapy (con gurable web scraper) and Splash (headless browser) libraries, we were able to easily scrape thousands of websites per day using one Scrapy cloud unit and a small Splash instance (which respectively cost $9 and $25 USD per month).
At every website we visited, we rst scrolled to the bottom and waited 1.5 seconds, to allow for delayed behaviors. We saved a copy of the page's DOM at this point as well as its HTTP Archive (HAR) 7 for subsequent processing. During an approximately 140 day timespan, we collected roughly 487 GB of total data: close to 400 GB from the Alexa websites (collected during 120 days) and the remainder from websites speci cally targeted by lter rules in Nano Defender list (collected during 140 days).
We scraped the Alexa Top 5K on a daily basis for 120 days, as well as websites targeted by the Anti-Adblock Killer and Nano Defender lter lists for 140 days. We used a Rake task 8 that downloads any commits to the two lter lists on a daily basis and extracts the URLs from newly added rules. This ensures a short turnaround time between addition of a new lter rule for a new website, and that site's inclusion in our scraper.
Our entire data collection process ran roughly from April through August in 2017 with a variety of false-starts and engineering challenges beforehand to get it running.
Data processing and analysis
For each web site image scraped, and for each set of lter rules against which we need to evaluate it, we used the open source Libadblockplus library 9 to determine whether that day's lter list would "trigger" on the downloaded version of a website for that day. We speci cally chose Libadblockplus because it is a C++ wrapper around the Javascript Adblock Plus core engine, reducing the likelihood of its behavior di ering from in-browser adblocking. Libadblockplus, when given the result of the web scraper and a lter list, returns a list of matched web page elements with their corresponding matched rules. An exception rule that also matches the same web page element will suppress that web page element from the list of results.
Recall that EasyList and Nano Defender use exception rules in di erent ways. EasyList uses exceptions to narrow otherwise overbroad positive rules, avoiding undesired damage to a web page. Nano Defender, on the other hand, uses exceptions to avoid touching bait elements used by anti-adblocking logic. As such, we invert the sense of Nano Defender's exception rules; if a Nano Defender exception rule triggers on a web page element, we consider that to be a successful match, because it's operating to defeat an anti-adblocker.
Due to the size of our data set, we split these jobs into smaller chunks (generally 250 websites at a time) which we ran in parallel on our institutional cluster. This enabled us to process months of scrape data using canonical versions of the various lter lists in a handful of days. We saved the results of these compute jobs as simple JSON les, in which we mapped websites to lists of ( lter rule, o ending resource) pairs for each day of scraped data.
We plotted these results (see e.g., Figure 1 ) with the time since the rule's introduction on the horizontal axis and collected data on the vertical axis. Speci cally, each row corresponds to one (website, lter-rule) tuple. For a given day x and a given tuple (website, lter-rule), the value of the point (x, ) in the graph is either true, false, or fail, and colored as follows:
• Black: true-the archived copy for day x of the website triggered a hit on the lter rule. • White: false-the archived copy for day x did not trigger a hit. • Gray: fail-no data available. 9 https://github.com/adblockplus/libadblockplus In our graphs and data processing, rows with lter rules that never triggered on those sites are omitted. As such, for each combination of a website and a lter rule that triggered at least once on that website, we ended up with a row of data in our graphs. Failures may be due to failure to contact the website, but also occur when the day is outside the observation window of the website. We discuss this further, below.
Our graphing technique is designed to align each row based on the date at which the rule was introduced. Each value of (x, ( site , rule )) shows whether lter rule rule still triggered on the copy of website site after x days.
To clarify this alignment process, consider Figure 1 , where there are two gray "triangles" of missing data. The data rows adjacent to the lower-left triangle correspond to cases where the rule predates the start of our experiment. So if a rule was 80 days old at the start of the experiment, then we would only render results for x = 80 → 120. The data rows adjacent to the upper-right triangle correspond to cases where the rule appeared while our experiment was ongoing. So, if a rule appeared on day 80, we would only have 40 days of results for the e ectiveness of that rule, appearing at x = 0 → 40.
A consequence of this alignment process is that vertical slices through the graph contain all the ltering e ectiveness data we have for rules of a given age.
Statistical Methods
Plotting the data as described above allows us to gauge the e ectiveness of lter list rules over time. Speci cally, we use the ratio of total number of hits for a given day x versus the total number of hits + misses as an approximation of the overall e ectiveness of lter list rules after x days. We would expect this ratio to decline as websites take measures to reduce the e ectiveness of lter rules.
Note that collapsing an entire column into a single value misses out on sources of uncertainty hidden in the value. The process of scraping websites includes a number of sources of noise. Principal amongst these is that the number of lter rules for which we do not have data varies from day to day. For example, in Figure 3 , there is little data available after 40 days, and scant after 80. Thus, it is essential to model the uncertainty in our data.
To get meaningful error bars for our graphs, we cannot simply take the standard deviation of a sequence of 1's and 0's. Instead, we use bootstrap resampling (see, e.g., [18]), a standard technique for computing many common statistics. In our case, we compute the 95% con dence interval over the mean. Bootstrap resampling produces a robust result without requiring the data to be normally distributed [4] .
Bootstrap resampling in a nutshell: Bootstrap resampling is a statistical measure that relies on sampling with replacement. Consider a data set with n elements over which the average is computed. To determine the con dence intervals, we rst randomly sample (with replacement) n values from the data set. We compute the average of this sample. We then repeat this sampling process 5,000 times, yielding 5,000 so-called "resampled averages". These are then sorted from small to large. The 2.5th percentile and the 97.5th percentile of this list then provide us with bounds on the con dence interval. This corresponds to a 95% con dence interval around the average. We then can render these con dence intervals as error bars on our graphs.
ANALYSIS
We rst consider the popular EasyList lter and next look at the more targeted Nano Defender lters. We also consider how our data can con rm results from prior studies.
EasyList
Our analysis of the e ectiveness of EasyList lter rules showed two discontinuous sections (see Figure 2 ). This is due to the denominator changing signi cantly after x = 75, which is an artifact of our methodology. As can be seen in Figure 1 , we have signi cantly more data for the rst 75 days of lter rules existence than for the latter 45 days. This is because EasyList added a large number of lter rules for new websites on day 45 of our experiment. Since we could monitor the performance of these rules from their introduction, these are all plotted from x = 0 in Figure 1 .
In Figure 2 , the rst section depicts a long period in which large number of EasyList's lter rules show declining e ectiveness. A simple linear best t of this section (plotted as a straight line on the graph) shows a decrease of just over 0.13% per day, with a total loss of roughly 10% in about 75 days. These results exclude EasyList's "exception rules" (see Section 2.2). Taking these rules into account, we see a the decrease of roughly 0.2% per day on average, with a total loss of roughly 15% in the same period of time. (Visually, the resulting graphs appear similar to Figure 2 and are omitted for space.) The obvious explanation is that websites and advertisers do indeed respond to the introduction of new EasyList lter rules.
Following the discontinuity at approximately day 75 we observe no signi cant decline; attempting to plot a linear best t as we did in the prior section of the graph results in a horizontal line. This suggests the underlying process of website operators and advertisers responding to EasyList is not a linear process. A longer time period of data collection over many more websites might well show a t to an exponential curve.
Nano Defender
We next examine the e ectiveness of the more targeted antiadblock lter rules in the Nano Defender lter list. In addition to the Alexa Top 5K (see Figure 3 ) we also looked at websites outside this list that were speci cally targeted by Nano Defender (see Figure 5 ). Figure 4 shows that initially the lter e ectiveness rate is approximated by a horizontal line. The upward trend in the averages is overwhelmed by the growing con dence intervals. Our best interpretation is that there is no evidence of a decay in Nano Defender's lter rule e ectiveness over time. From roughly x = 45 on, we no longer have su cient data. This is clearly illustrated in the increasing size of the con dence intervals, and also apparent in Figure 3 . Notwithstanding this lack of data for later days, the absence of a downward trend in the rst part of Figure 4 is signi cant, and thus we conclude that in general, websites are currently neither tracking nor responding to updates in the Nano Defender lter rules.
A curious possibility is that the absence of observed lter e ectiveness decay in the Nano Defender data, versus the presence of decay in the EasyList data, controls for the possibility that web sites are simply drifting over time in their engineering practices. If that were the cause of our observed lter e ectiveness decay, then we should see a similar e ect in both data sets. Contrarily, the engineering of Nano Defender is much more speci cally targeted than the engineering of EasyList, so it's also possible that a "drift e ect" would impact EasyList's e ectiveness more than it impacts Nano Defender.
Comparing results with prior studies
Iqbal et al.
[9] also looked at subsections of EasyList and Anti-Adblock Killer (their work predates the Nano Defender list). They found, for the Alexa Top 5K websites, that Nano triggered on 8.7% websites and that AdblockWarningRemoval-List combined with the anti-adblock sections of EasyList (hereafter "AWRL/EasyList" ) only triggered on 0.4% websites. Nithyanand et al.
[17] similarly found anti-adblocking logic on 6.7% of the Alexa Top 5K.
To compare their results with our data, where we have multiple samples of each lter lists and of each website, we restate their question as follows: Do any versions of Nano Defender list or AWRL/EasyList trigger on any versions of each given website? We nd that the combined Nano Defender list triggered on roughly 13.3% of the Alexa Top 5K (exactly 666 unique websites) and that AWRL/EasyList triggered on 0.06% of the Alexa Top 5K (exactly 3 websites). Our observed growth in anti-adblocking logic relative to Iqbal's results likely combines two e ects: a genuine increase in websites using such logic, as well as increased engineering e orts on the part of Nano Defender to detect and lter such logic. AWRL/EasyList has remained comparatively static with fairly few commits in the same period of time; websites and advertisers have clearly engineered around AWRL/EasyList. We next focus on PageFair, a commercial service that provides websites with adblocking analytics and adblockresistant advertising. Nithyanand et al. [17] looked at a number of such services, nding 20 web sites using PageFair, which was then successfully blocked by AdBlockPlus and Privacy Badger, but not Ghostery. We detected 67 separate websites in the Alexa Top 5K using PageFair, all of which are successfully ltered by the Nano Defender list.
Nithyanand also discussed the arms race of websites detecting and responding to adblockers. They noted that adblock detection scripts are often loaded from popular content distribution networks such as Cloud are. One prominent such project is "BlockAdblock". This project appears to have been available from Cloud are since at least August 2015. We detected 20 websites in the Alexa Top 5K using some variant of BlockAdblock. Surprisingly, we detected only one of these websites using the suggested Cloud are CDN URL; 8 of the remaining 19 used a URL owned by an advertising company, another 10 chose to serve a copy of the script themselves, and one website used a di erent CDN service.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We observed an approximate 0.13% decrease per day in the e ectiveness on the Alexa Top 5000 web sites of new rules in the EasyList lter list in the immediate period after they were added. However, websites did not appear to be actively responding to updates in the more specialized and less widely used Nano Defender list.
There are numerous opportunities for additional work in this area. For example, scaling up our methodology to run on millions rather than thousands of web sites, and for longer periods of time, would certainly be feasible and interesting. Using Scrapinghub, scaling the data collection is straightforward, albeit more expensive. Analyzing larger volumes of collected data would certainly require larger computing clusters, which require an additional expense to rent. At least the process is straightforward to distribute on a cluster, since each web site scrape, evaluated against each lter ruleset, is a completely independent task.
Another interesting possibility would be to cluster the various anti-adblocking mechanisms that a longer-term survey might discover over time, to understand the diversity of the anti-adblocking ecosystem.
